Time Moves Faster When There is Nothing You Anticipate-The Role of Time in MEV Rewards.

We present a novel analysis of a competitive dynamic present on Ethereum known as "waiting games", where validators can use their distinct monopoly position in their assigned slots to delay block proposals in order to optimize returns through Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) payments, a type of incentive outside the Proof-of-Stake incentive scheme. However, this strategy risks block exclusion due to missed slots or potential orphaning. Our analysis reveals evidence that, although there are substantial incentives to undertaking the risks, validators are not capitalizing on waiting games, leaving potential profits unrealized. Moreover, we present an agent-based model to test the eventual consensus disruption caused by waiting games under different settings, arguing that such disruption only occurs with significant delay strategies. Ultimately, this research provides in-depth insights into Ethereum's waiting games, illuminating the trade-offs and potential profit opportunities for validators in this evolving blockchain landscape.