Augmenting the MetaMask-Wallet with Domain Name based Authentication of Ethereum Accounts

Jonas Ebel, 19.04.2021, Master Thesis Final Presentation

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Outline

1. Background and Motivation
2. Research Questions
3. Design Concept
4. Usability Testing
5. Conclusion and Outlook

Background

Authentication of Ethereum Accounts in MetaMask

Ethereum Blockchain

- Introduced 2015
- Public permissionless Blockchain
- Smart Contract describes business logic

MetaMask

- Wallet for Ethereum
- Manages the user‘s access to its accounts
- Browser Extension

Motivation

Authentication of Ethereum Accounts in MetaMask

Primary Objective of Authentication

Enhancing user security

Motivation

Primary Objective: Enhancing user security

Unreadable Ethereum Address
0xdc51Bac25e1c22E2F04bAAc20396D99fe56f7359

Cryptocurrencies
Anonymous by Design

We argue
Anonymity inhibits use cases

Authentication Solution
TLS/SSL endorsed-Smart Contracts (TeSC) by Gallersdörfer



Background

TLS/SSL endorsed Smart Contracts

Example.com



TeSC Endorsement

0xdc…59



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TLS/SSL endorsed Smart Contracts



- **Owners can store cryptographic proofs of ownership in their Ethereum address**
- **We assert this proof to facilitate authentication in MetaMask**

Research Questions

1. How can the indication of domain name-based authentication be designed for MetaMask?

Design Concept based on Browser Analysis

2. What is a feasible architecture concept to authenticate addresses in MetaMask?

TeSC Verification Algorithm

3. Does the application of domain name-based authentication improve the user's security while interacting with Ethereum?

Usability Study

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Design Concept Based on States

All states are displayed on the Confirmation Screen in MetaMask

1. Authenticated
2. Critical Error
3. Protocol Downgrade

Design Concept (1/3)

Authentication Indication

- TeSC Authentication was successful
- The current website is associated with the Ethereum Address
- User can double check, whether this is the expected identity



Design Concept (2/3)

Critical Error Indication

- TeSC Authentication failed
- User is interrupted in flow
- Two-stages Design
  - First: General Warning
  - Second: Technical Explanation





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Usability Testing (1/5)

Experiment Facts

- **Question**
  Are more users able to identify a fraudulent address with our design?

- 40 Participants
- Within-Subject Measurements

- **Scenario-based Test**
  - Trusted expert Alice
  - Initial Coin Offering of GreatCoin
  - 2 Transactions

Usability Testing (2/5)

Scenario

Problem

Participants shall trust the company but stay vigilant for attacks

Trust establishment

Alice recommends GreatCoin	Alice highlights general investment risk
Users trust the Company	Users stay suspicious to protect their money

Procedure

1. Augmented MetaMask

1. Participants receive offer to invest in ICO
2. Participants receive a special offer for a sec… …ment

Fraudulent Recipient

Randomize order of MetaMask

2. Original MetaMask

Repeat Experiment

Usability Testing (3/5)

Second Transaction



Usability Testing (4/5)

Results





Improved behaviour in the augmented MetaMask

This barplot omits the pairing of the data

Usability Testing (5/5)

Statistical Significance Testing: McNemar Test

Paired cancel rate
The participant cancels the transaction in the original and in the augmented Metamask

McNemar Test
Tests relation of *discordant pairs* being close to 0.5

$$p = 1{,}862\ e^{-9}$$

We can reject the H_0 with a confidence level of $\alpha = 0.001$

We are confident that our solution enhances the user's security



Limitations and Further Work

Certificate Retrieval

- TeSC requires certificates for assertion
- Only Firefox supports access to Certificates

Solution is required for other Browsers

Use Case coverage in Experiment

- Scenario covers only one aspect of proposed verification algorithm
- External validity of experiment-based design

Field Studies could result in better performance

Browser as Design Reference

- Could not include Safari
- Efficiency of Browser‘s warnings unclear

Include other reference systems

Handling Protocol Downgrade

- No interruption on Downgrade
- 3 Participants do not get warned

Threat level analysis requires enhancement

Thank you for your Attention!
Any Questions?

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First Transaction



Design Concept Based on States

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Browser







Augmented MetaMask





Design Concept (3/3)

Downgrade Indication

- Receiver does not comply with TeSC
- Frequently met due to low adoption of TeSC
- Browser-Parallel: HTTP Indication
- Users must check legitimacy of receiver themselves